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We model an election between two Downsian mainstream candidates and a third inflexible politician. There is uncertainty …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011537537
We study a game theoretic model of a parliamentary democracy under proportional representation where ideologically motivated citizen groups form parties, voting occurs and governments are formed. We study the coalition governments that emerge as functions of the parties' seat shares, the size of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013367780
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choices in US political history, such as the ratification of the Constitution in 1787 and the election of Lincoln in 1860 …-based models of election tend to conclude that candidates, or parties, converge to a vote-maximizing policy position at the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014023834
varies over time. Changes in popularity are partly exogenous and partly driven by the parties' actions. There is an election … scheduled at a future date and the party with more popularity at the election date wins the vote. Electoral incentives can have … substantial effects on bargaining outcomes. Periods of gridlock may arise when the election is close and parties have similar …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011704960
This paper analyses a model of legislative bargaining in which parties form tentative coalitions (protocoalitions) before deciding on the allocation of a resource. Protocoalitions may fail to reach an agreement, in which case they may be dissolved (breakdown) and a new protocoalition may form....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011316670
One feature of legislative bargaining in naturally occurring settings is that the distribution of seats or voting weights often does not accurately reflect bargaining power. Game-theoretic predictions about payoffs and coalition formation are insensitive to nominal differences in vote...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012822445
The purpose of this paper is to identify learning in games in experimental economic settings, and apply their results to real multilateral trade negotiations, such as the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) in the World Trade Organizations (WTO). This paper argues that the structure of games including...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011572871
We analyze a three-player legislative bargaining game over an ideological and a distributive decision. Legislators are privately informed about their ideological intensities, i.e., the weight placed on the ideological decision relative to the weight placed on the distributive decision....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674460