parliaments and facilitate the formation of a coalition government. However, the clauses also introduce distortions and modify the … necessary to measure the difficulties in forming a coalition government and to quantify the effects of electoral thresholds on … these difficulties. For this issue, we introduce a concept based on cooperative game theory which takes into account the …

obtain that many of the informative equilibria are sustained by a coalition government, however the coalition is never …

We study the possibilities for agenda manipulation under strategic voting for two prominent sequential voting … surprisingly, simple majority voting is not necessarily the optimal choice of a society that is concerned about agenda manipulation. …

Despite the wide variety of agendas used in legislative settings, the literature on sophisticated voting has focused on … characterize the social choice rules implemented by sophisticated voting on agendas with these two features. I also characterize … related to the prevailing rules for order-of-voting used by legislatures. These results establish a clear connection between …

distribution with independent marginals then, under weak conditions, voting on the original issues is not optimal. If the marginals … are identical (but not necessarily independent), then voting first on the total sum and next on the differences is often … welfare superior to voting on the original issues. We also provide various lower bounds on incentive efficiency: in particular …

studies strategic voting when voters have pure common values but may be ambiguity averse -- exhibit Ellsberg-type behavior …