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A structural model of a multitasking salesforce : job task allocation and incentive plan design
Kim, Minkyung; Sudhir, K.; Uetake, Kosuke - 2019
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012126814
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Push or pull? : performance-pay, incentives, and information
Rietzke, David; Chen, Yu - 2018
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011864842
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Anreizprobleme beim Transfer der Kreditrisiken aus Buchkrediten
Henke, Sabine - 2002
Finanzintermediäre können eine portfoliotheoretisch motivierte Optimierung ihres Buchkreditportefeuilles nur unter der Bedingung realisieren, dass die Kreditrisiken am Sekundärmarkt handelbar sind. Mit Kreditverkäufen, Kreditverbriefungen und Kreditderivaten haben sich die Möglichkeiten...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011402083
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Anreizprobleme beim Transfer der Kreditrisiken aus Buchkrediten
Henke, Sabine - 2002
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001706389
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When trust fades... : can optimal mechanisms for policy decisions always be designed?
Major, Iván - 2013
design I prove in the paper, that government - as principal - is only capable of applying "perverse" incentives towards the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010211955
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Physician payment contracts in the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection : the theory and its application to Ontario
Kantarevic, Jasmin; Kralj, Boris - 2015
We develop a stylized principal-agent model with moral hazard and adverse selection to provide a unified framework for understanding some of the most salient features of the recent physician payment reform in Ontario and its impact on physician behavior. These features include: (1) physicians...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011288527
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Dynamic managerial compensation : on the optimality of seniority-based schemes
Garrett, Daniel F.; Pavan, Alessandro - 2014
We study the optimal dynamics of incentives for a manager whose ability to generate cash .ows changes stochastically … with time and is his private information. We show that, in general, the power of incentives (or "pay for performance") may … power of incentives later in the relationship. Our results follow from a new variational approach that permits us to tackle …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010476876
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Adverse selection and moral hazard with multidimensional types
Kwon, Suehyun - 2017 - First draft: March 1, 2017
This paper studies a contracting problem where agents' cost of actions is private information. With two actions, this leads to a two-dimensional screening problem with moral hazard. There is a natural one-dimensional ordering of types when there is both adverse selection and moral hazard....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011718471
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Informed principals in the credit market when borrowers and lenders are heterogeneous
Barigozzi, Francesca; Tedeschi, Piero - 2016
. However, when the type of the borrowers is not observable, then standard borrowers have incentives to invest in ethical …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011705659
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Two essays on the economics of adverse selection and moral hazard
Stewart, Jay Charles - 1989
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000809726