"Rational Queueing provides one of the first unified accounts of the dynamic aspects involved in the strategic behavior in queues. It explores the performance of queueing systems where multiple agents, such as customers, servers, and central managers, all act but often in a noncooperative...

We consider a politician's choice of whether to be evaluated, as by subjecting himself to a detailed interview or by asking for the appointment of a special prosecutor. We find that both when politicians do and do not know the quality of their own actions, stable equilibria may exist in which...

Consider a government that adopts a program, sees a noisy signal about its success, and decides whether to continue the program. Suppose further that the success of a program is greater if people think it will be continued. This paper considers the optimal decision rule for continuing the...

Consider a government that adopts a program, sees a noisy signal about its success, and decides whether to continue the program. Suppose further that the success of a program is greater if people think it will be continued. This paper considers the optimal decision rule for continuing the...

We consider an individual's choice whether to be evaluated. Separating signaling equilibria can arise when individuals are risk averse, even if the cost of evaluation is zero for all.