We investigate an increasingly prevalent CEO succession strategy: recruiting CEOs from the board of directors (director-CEOs). Director-CEOs might be hired in a planned succession because they combine outsiders' new perspectives with insiders' firm-specific knowledge. Alternatively, directors...

This paper examines the economic consequences for firms that hire CEOs who have a reputation for being turnaround specialists. Abnormal returns around announcements that turnaround specialists have been hired as CEOs are significantly positive and more than 6 percentage points larger than the...

We present a model in which managers are risk-averse and firms compete for scarce managerial talent ("alpha"). When managers are not mobile across firms, firms provide efficient compensation, which allows for learning about managerial talent and for insurance of low-quality managers. When...

We present a model where firms compete for scarce managerial talent ("alpha") and managers are risk-averse. When managers cannot move across firms after being hired, employers learn about their talent, allocate them efficiently to projects and provide insurance to low-quality managers. When...