After a large bank merger the compensation of the surviving bank's CEO often increases materially. Theories of executive compensation based on managerial productivity and optimal incentives suggest that changes in CEO compensation are related to the potential gains from merger. Alternatively,...

We investigate corporate governance of Japanese banks from the 1970s to the 1990s. In spite of economic shocks to the operating environment of Japanese banks over this period, there are few mergers, failures, and other changes in ownership and control. We also find that executive turnover is...

After a large bank merger the compensation of the surviving bank's CEO often increases materially. Theories of executive compensation based on managerial productivity and optimal incentives suggest that changes in CEO compensation are related to the potential gains from merger. Alternatively,...

By investigating the extent to which target directors bargain in their own interests during negotiations between merging banks, we document a strong inverse relation between merger premium and target director retention. This relation holds for both executive (inside) directors and independent...

Although industry deregulation leads to changes in the scale and scope of the duties of the board of directors, little is known about the changes in incentives for directors surrounding such events. The deregulation of the U.S. banking industry and associated technological and regulatory changes...