We provide a model of dynamic duopoly in which firms face financial constraints and disappear when they are unable to fulfill them. We show that, in some cases, Cournot outputs are no longer supported in equilibrium, because if these outputs were set, a firm may have incentives to ruin the...

In this paper, we present a model of implementation where infea- sible allocations are converted into feasible ones through a process of renego- tiation that is represented by a reversion function. We describe the maximal set of Social Choice Correspondences that can be implemented in Nash Equi-...

Abstract: Disequilibrium trade can occur in a market lacking both recontracting options and a computational system that maps utilities into prices. This paper studies disequilibrium trade in a large market for an indivisible good. We focus on two issues: the speed of adjustment when arbitrage...

We compare two contest. Decentralized in which there are several independent contests with non overlapping contestants and Centralized in which all contestants fight for a unique prize which is the sum of all prizes in the small contests. We study the relationship between payoffs and efforts...

In this paper we present a Contest Sucess Function (CSF) which is homogeneous of degree zero and where the probabilities of winning the prize depend on the relative difference of efforts. With two agents, we present a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a Nash Equilibrium in...

This paper focus on the dynamics of organizations. Agents are grouped into three classes, high, medium and low productivity. We analyze the evolution of organizations which take decisions on whom to hire and how to share the output by plurality voting. We study the evolution of political power...