This paper examines the spillovers of the sanction procedures on listed companies which were victims of others' financial regulatory breaches (i.e. regulated entities or individuals). Market manipulators can be investigated and possibly sanctioned for doing so, according to the French...

We examine how the publication of intentional financial crimes committed by listed firms is interpreted by financial markets, using a systematic and quantitative review of existing empirical studies. Specifically, we conduct a meta-regression analysis and investigate the extent and nature of the...

We provide the first quantitative synthesis of the literature on how financial markets react to the disclosure of financial crimes committed by listed firms. While consensus expects negative stock price returns, the exact size of the effect is far from clear. We survey 111 studies published over...

This article investigates tunneling by controlling shareholders in China's public companies, and finds that, first, tunneling is pervasive and severe; and, second, private controlling ownership significantly increases the severity of tunneling. This article argues that in China, where there is...

We analyze class action litigation as a corporate governance device. Firms that have lower internal governance standards and those with fewer external monitors are more likely to be indicted. Lawsuits announcements are salient information to the market, as firms, on average, lose 12.3% without a...

This article explores price impact in the context of securities fraud litigation, focusing on the probability of observing directionally-consistent abnormal returns (those that go in the direction of a plaintiff's theory of liability) under the hypothesis of price impact versus no price impact....