The Ellsberg paradox demonstrates that peoples belief over uncertainevents might not be representable by subjective probability. We relate this paradox to other commonly observed anomalies, suchas a rejection of the backward induction prediction in the one-shot Ultimatum Game. We argue that the...

The Ellsberg paradox demonstrates that people's belief over uncertain events might not be representable by subjective probability. We argue that Uncertainty Aversion may be viewed as a case of "Rule Rationality''. This paradigm claims that people's decision making has evolved to simple rules...

We recover approximate parametric preferences from consistent and inconsistent consumer choices. The procedure seeks to utilize revealed preference information contained in choices by minimizing its ranking inconsistency with the proposed parametric preferences. We provide a novel...

A sequence of experiments documents static and dynamic ``preference reversals'' between sooner-smaller and later-larger rewards, when the sooner reward could be immediate. The theoretically-motivated design permits separate identification of time-consistent, stationary and time-invariant...

An extension to Ellsberg's experiment demonstrates that attitudes to ambiguity and compound objective lotteries are tightly associated. The sample is decomposed into three main groups: subjective expected utility subjects - who reduce compound objective lotteries and are ambiguity neutral, and...