We study market efficiency in an infinite-horizon model with a monopolistic insider. The insider can trade with a competitive market maker and noise traders, and observes privately the expected growth rate of asset dividends. In the absence of the insider, this information would be reflected in...

We study market efficiency in an infinite-horizon model with a monopolistic insider. The insider can trade with a competitive market maker and noise traders, and observes privately the expected growth rate of asset dividends. In the absence of the insider, this information would be reflected in...

We study market efficiency in an infinite-horizon model with a monopolistic insider. The insider can trade with competitive market makers and noise traders, and observes privately the expected growth rate of asset dividends. In the absence of the insider, this information would be reflected in...

The theory of labor contract with worker’s chosen effort level mainly rests upon the principal-agent paradigm. In many labor markets however, the principal is not as free as assumed in the standard theory, but is submitted to some binding institutional constraints. It is requested in...

This paper studies a dynamic equilibrium with small fixed transactions costs. We consider an overlapping generations economy with two assets of different liquidity. Trading the liquid asset does not involve transactions costs while trading the illiquid asset requires a fixed transaction fee....

We propose a dynamic equilibrium model of a multi-asset market with stochastic volatility and transaction costs. Our key assumption is that investors are fund managers, subject to withdrawals when fund performance falls below a threshold. This generates a preference for liquidity that is...