This paper is an attempt to study fundamentally the valuation of insurance contracts. We start from the observation that insurance contracts are inherently linked to financial markets, be it via interest rates, or – as in hybrid products, equity-linked life insurance and variable annuities –...

We describe a top-down procedure for the supervisory accounting of insurance companies with special emphasis on market impacts. The technical tools are a multiperiod risk assessment, a market consistent best estimate and an eligible asset. First, to avoid supervisory arbitrage by financial...

This paper aims at providing a mathematical foundation for the terms of the well spread supervisory rule 'initial market value of assets must be at least equal to provision plus solvency capital'.It starts with a risk-adjusted assessment - given by a set of test probabilities - of the future...

We examine the ingredients of Solvency II, namely its free capital, provision and solvency capital requirement. They are of course linked by the accounting equality but we claim that they should be more deeply related to each other since solvency naturally should require positivity of available...

This paper deals with issues concerning the core as a solution concept for games in coalitional form as well as the use of these games in representing economies of a certain formal type. Side-payment games are imbedded in the more general class of no-side-payment games. It is shown that to a...

This paper is based on a general method for multiperiod prudential supervision of companies submitted to hedgeable and non-hedgeable risks. Having treated the case of insurance in an earlier paper, we now consider a quantitative approach to supervision of commercial banks. The various elements...

The Fundamental Theorem of Asset Pricing states - roughly speaking - that the absence of arbitrage possibilities for a stochastic process S is equivalent to the existence of an equivalent martingale measure for S. It turns out that it is quite hard to give precise and sharp versions of this...