Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 14,662
Cover Image
Backward ownership, uniform pricing and entry deterrence
Hunold, Matthias - 2017
and thereby can lead to market foreclosure. Based on this theory, the article reviews a merger case in the financial …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011649373
Cover Image
Platform competition : market structure and pricing
Borsenberge, Claire; Cremer, Helmuth; Joram, Denis; … - 2019
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012181523
Cover Image
The competitive effects of vertical integration in platform markets
Pouyet, Jérôme; Thomas, Trégouët - 2021
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012617587
Cover Image
Vertical mergers, foreclosure and raising rivals' costs: Experimental evidence
Normann, Hans-Theo - 2010
The hypothesis that vertically integrated firms have an incentive to foreclose the input market because foreclosure …. A powerful argument against this hypothesis is that, absent commitment, such foreclosure cannot occur in Nash …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010302573
Cover Image
Backward ownership, uniform pricing and entry deterrence
Hunold, Matthias - 2017
and thereby can lead to market foreclosure. Based on this theory, the article reviews a merger case in the financial …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011649478
Cover Image
Do we (still) need to regulate fixed network retail markets?
Briglauer, Wolfgang; Götz, Georg; Schwarz, Anton - 2008
In the beginning of fixed network liberalisation in Europe in the late 1990s, the main concern of regulators was to lower calls prices. This was done by introducing wholesale regulation and promoting service based competition. Some years later, the concern of some regulators turned from too high...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010265881
Cover Image
Vertical integration, raising rivals' costs and upstream collusion
Normann, Hans-Theo - 2008
This paper analyzes the impact vertical integration has on upstream collusion when the price of the input is linear. As a first step, the paper derives the collusive equilibrium that requires the lowest discount factor in the infinitely repeated game when one firm is vertically integrated. It...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266966
Cover Image
Foreclosure and tunneling with partial vertical ownership
Hunold, Matthias; Petrishcheva, Vasilisa - 2022
input foreclosure or customer foreclosure. We show that the incentives to foreclose can be higher, equal, or even lower with …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013385143
Cover Image
Estimating vertical foreclosure in US gasoline supply
Aydemir, Zava; Buehler, Stefan - 2002
develop a novel framework for directly evaluating the strategic foreclosure effect and the effciency benefits associated with … vertical integration. Applying this framework, we find significant evidence for both vertical foreclosure and effciency … benefits. The foreclosure effect dominates the effciency benefits for more than half of the refining firms in the sample …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010315497
Cover Image
Asymmetric vertical integration
Buehler, Stefan; Schmutzler, Armin - 2004
identify countervailing forces resulting from strong vertical foreclosure, upstream sales and endogenous acquisition costs. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010315532