Bayesian equilibria are characterized by means of consistency and one-person rationality in combination with non-emptiness or converse consistency. Moreover, strong and coalition-proof Bayesian equilibria of extended Bayesian games are introduced and it is seen that these notions can be...

In this paper we consider the location of the eigenvalues of the composite matrix ( -A S1 S2 ) ( Q1 At 0 ) ( Q2 0 At ) , where the matrices Si and Qi are assumed to be semi-positive definite. Two interesting observations, which are not or only partially mentioned in literature before, challenge...

In this paper we characterize the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of a location-then-price game where firms first choose locations and after that compete for prices in two subsequent periods. Locations are thus seen as long term commitments. There are two types of consumers, each with different...

In this paper we study the endogenous formation of cooperation structures or communication graphs between players in a superadditive TU game. For each cooperation structure that is formed, the payoffs to the players are determined by an exogenously given solution. We model the process of...

Although a mixed strategy can never be evolutionarily stable in a truly asymmetric contest, examples show that mixed strategies can satisfy the weaker criterion on neutral stability. This paper shows that such examples are rare, and, generically, a mixed strategy is unstable. We apply the result...

This paper surveys some recent developments in (non-cooperative) game theory and provides an outlook on the near future of that theory. In particular, attention is focused on the limitations inherent in normative game theory and on attempts to construct a behavioral version of the theory that...