market for experts. The information the expert reveals decreases as his bias moves toward stronger preference for the status …We analyze situations in which an expert is biased toward some decision but cares also about his reputation in the …, revealing the intensity of the expert's bias doesn't always improve the information he reveals in equilibrium. The presence of a …

By bundling experience goods, a manufacturer can more easily maintain a reputation for high quality over time. Formally …

of privately known competence, who cares about his reputation, chooses the timing of the forecast regarding the outcome …. Further, any report hurts the forecaster’s reputation in the short run, with later reports incurring larger penalties. The … reputation of a silent forecaster, on the other hand, gradually improves over time. …

make a voluntary payment, a bonus, after observing advice quality. While the combination of competition and reputation …. Thus, our results suggest that a voluntary component can act as a substitute for either competition or reputation …

We analyze how financial experts influence asset prices in a sequential trading model. In the model, an expert of … information about the expert's ability is private to traders and only revealed through trades. When the expert's reputation is …

This paper analyses the market for professional (expert) services where the experts are motivated by reputational … characteristics can induce clients to choose between experts with different reputations. The paper shows that clients choices have an … important impact on the incentives of experts to provide a high quality service. In particular, sorting of clients affects …