We describe a mechanism for government taking under uncertainty that provides incentives for governments to make efficient taking decisions and for property owners to use their properties efficiently. We argue that efficiency in takings requires that governments not only pay the value of...

When urban renewal projects require that smaller parcels be assembled into a single large one, owners who hold out for higher prices may either prevent or significantly delay socially efficient redevelopment. Local governments seeking private redevelopment currently have only the choice between...

The efficiency of mechanisms to control CO2 emissions is limited by disagreement about the harm from these emissions. Thus existing emission control mechanisms require negotiated compromise regarding either the efficient price or the level of emissions to be tolerated. As an alternative to...

A decomposition of aggregate labor productivity based on internationally comparable data reveals that a high share of employment and low labor productivity in agriculture are mainly responsible for low aggregate productivity in poor countries. Using a two-sector general-equilibrium model, we...