In a social choice model with an infinite number of agents, there may occur "equal size" coalitions that a preference aggregation rule should treat in the same manner. We introduce an axiom of equal treatment with respect to a measure of coalition size and explore its interaction with common...

We consider a committee with common interests. Committee members do not know which of two alternatives is the best, but each member may acquire privately a costly signal before casting a vote under either majority or unanimity rule. In the lab, as predicted by Bayesian equilibrium, voters are...

The information and communication technologies (ICT) sectors are in a process of technological convergence. Determinant factors in this process are the liberalisation of the telecommunications markets and technological change. Many firms are engaged in a process of mergers and alliances to...

We develop in this paper a systematic study of the stochastic dominance ordering in spaces of measures. We collect and present in an orderly fashion, results that are spread out in the Applied Probability and Mathematical Economics literature, and extend most of them to a somewhat broader...

Fishburn (1970) showed that in an infinite society Arrow's axioms for a preference aggregation rule do not necessarily imply a dictator. Kirman and Sondermann (1972) showed that, in this case, nondictatorial rules imply an invisible dictator that, whenever the agent set is an atomless finite...

We develop in this paper a systematic study of the stochastic dominance ordering in spaces of measures. We collect and present in an orderly fashion, results that are spread out in the Applied Probability and Mathematical Economics literature, and extend most of them to a somewhat broader...

We consider a Bayesian decision problem in which an agent must draw inferences about multiple unobserved variables. This problem appears in different economic settings, for instance in the theory of agency. Assume that both observed and unobserved variables are ordered. We say that the inference...

In this paper we introduce communication into intergroup ultimatum bargaining in a lab. The responder groups vote whether to accept the proposals with unanimity required either for acceptance or for rejection. In contrast with the no-communication results reported in our previous study...

This paper reports results of an experimental study of uniform and discriminatory auctions of multiple objects in an environment of publicly known common values. We find that the bidding behavior in the uniform case exhibits two clear regularities: agents consistently play weakly dominated...