This paper considers a partial equilibrium model of conflict where two asymmetric, rational and risk-neutral opponents … clash in order to redistribute a divisible prize in their favour. Differently from common contest models agents have the … option of choosing a second instrument to affect the outcome of the conflict. The second instrument is assumed to capture a …

This paper considers a partial equilibrium model of conflict where two asymmetric, rational and risk-neutral opponents … evaluate differently the contested stake. Differently from common contest models, agents have the option of choosing a second … instrument to affect the outcome of the conflict. The second instrument is assumed to capture positive investments in ‘conflict …

present results from a laboratory experiment in which two parties can appropriate resources via a contest or, alternatively … compares conflict choices of players in two-against-two, one-against-one, and two-against-one settings. Overall, we find … evidence for a higher propensity to opt for conflict when entering the fight in a group than when having to fight as a single …

This paper considers a partial equilibrium model of conflict where two asymmetric, rational and risk-neutral opponents … clash in order to redistribute a divisible prize in their favour. Differently from common contest models agents have the … option of choosing a second instrument to affect the outcome of the conflict. The second instrument is assumed to capture a …

I study information disclosure as a means to create conflict. A sender has information about two parties' relative …

One of the most important and disputed questions within the fields of international relations and conflict studies … of a mediation process is affected by two factors: the relative degree of conflict and the incentives to misrepresent … is a sufficiently low likelihood of a misrepresentation problem. If in addition, the relative degree of conflict is low …

contest. In both cases, when decisions to share information are made independently, sharing information is strictly dominated …

We consider a variant of the Tullock rent-seeking contest. Under symmetric information we determine equilibrium … the distribution costs are drawn from and on the exact specification of the contest success function. …

We consider a variant of the Tullock rent-seeking contest. Under symmetric information we determine equilibrium …