This paper considers a partial equilibrium model of conflict where two asymmetric, rational and risk-neutral opponents … clash in order to redistribute a divisible prize in their favour. Differently from common contest models agents have the … option of choosing a second instrument to affect the outcome of the conflict. The second instrument is assumed to capture a …

This paper considers a partial equilibrium model of conflict where two asymmetric, rational and risk-neutral opponents … evaluate differently the contested stake. Differently from common contest models, agents have the option of choosing a second … instrument to affect the outcome of the conflict. The second instrument is assumed to capture positive investments in ‘conflict …

I study information disclosure as a means to create conflict. A sender has information about two parties' relative …

One of the most important and disputed questions within the fields of international relations and conflict studies … of a mediation process is affected by two factors: the relative degree of conflict and the incentives to misrepresent … is a sufficiently low likelihood of a misrepresentation problem. If in addition, the relative degree of conflict is low …

This paper considers a partial equilibrium model of conflict where two asymmetric, rational and risk-neutral opponents … clash in order to redistribute a divisible prize in their favour. Differently from common contest models agents have the … option of choosing a second instrument to affect the outcome of the conflict. The second instrument is assumed to capture a …

We consider a variant of the Tullock rent-seeking contest. Under symmetric information we determine equilibrium …

contest. In both cases, when decisions to share information are made independently, sharing information is strictly dominated …

We consider a variant of the Tullock rent-seeking contest. Under symmetric information we determine equilibrium … the distribution costs are drawn from and on the exact specification of the contest success function. …

This paper studies a contest in which players with unobservable types may form an alliance in a pre-stage of the game … effort choice in the contest and there exist equilibria in which all types prefer to form an alliance. If the formation of an …