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This paper makes two empirical contributions to the literature, based on predictions generated by a lobby group model. First, we investigate how environmental lobby groups affect the determination of environmental policy in rich and developing countries. Second, we explore the interaction...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010928713
This paper examines the reasons why corruption and policy distortions tend to exhibit a high degree of persistence in certain regimes. We identify circumstances under which a firm seeks to evade regulations by (1) bribing of local inspectors, and (2) lobbying high-level government politicians to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014400451
This paper examines the reasons why corruption and policy distortions tend to exhibit a high degree of persistence in certain regimes. We identify circumstances under which a firm seeks to evade regulations by (1) bribing of local inspectors, and (2) lobbying high-level government politicians to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005263925
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001592882
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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001858608
This paper examines the reasons why corruption and policy distortions tend to exhibit a high degree of persistence in certain regimes. We identify circumstances under which a firm seeks to evade regulations by (1) bribing of local inspectors and (2) lobbying high-level government politicians to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012782668
This study explores the linkages between trade policy, corruption, and environmental policy. We begin by presenting a theoretical model that produces several testable predictions: i) trade liberalization raises the stringency of environmental policy; ii) corruption reduces environmental policy...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014036654
This paper provides a step towards a more complete theory of lobbying, extending the menu-auction model of Grossman and Helpman [Grossman, G.M., Helpman, E., 1994. American Economic Review 84, 833-850] A new explanation is proposed for why more concentrated industries more easily overcome the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014036797
Empirically collusive industries are known to be highly effective lobbyists. The reasons for this unclear and poorly understood. This paper provides a new explanation for the formation of protectionistic lobby groups. The level of collusion is shown to be a crucial determinant of the ability of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014038447