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it replaced. In this paper, we introduce a new framework for investigating school-choice matching problems and two ex …-ante notions of fairness in lottery design, strong ex-ante stability and ex-ante stability. This frame- work generalizes known one …-to-many two-sided and one-sided matching models. We first show that the new NYC/Boston mechanism fails to satisfy these fairness …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008507993
For the many-to-one matching model in which firms have substitutable and quota q-separable preferences over subsets of … college admissions problem) the workers-optimal stable matching is weakly Pareto optimal for the workers and the Blocking …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005247863
A fair division problem with indivisible objects, e.g. jobs, and one divisible good (money) is considered. The individuals consume one object and money. The class of strategy-proof and fair allocation rules is characterized. The allocation rules in the class are like a Vickrey auction bossy and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013208452
We study the problem of allocating objects among people. We consider cases where each object is initially owned by someone, no object is initially owned by anyone, and combinations of the two. The problems we look at are those where each person has a need for exactly one object and initially...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009643991
Which strategy-proof nonbossy mechanisms exist in a model with a finite number of indivisible goods (houses, jobs, positions) and a compensating perfectly divisible good (money)? The main finding is that only a finite number of distributions of the divisible good is consistent with...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005190590
This paper investigates the problem of allocating two types of indivisible objects among a group of agents when a priority-order must be respected and when only restricted monetary transfers are allowed. Since the existence of a fair allocation not generally is guaranteed due the the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005645206
A fair division problem with indivisible objects, e.g. jobs, and one divisible good (money) is considered. The individuals consume one object and money. The class of strategy-proof and fair allocation rules is characterized. The allocation rules in the class are like a Vickrey auction bossy and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005645228
Gale and Shapley (1962) proposed the deferred-acceptance algorithm for matching (i) college applicants and colleges and … always Pareto-optimal: No other matching is at least as good for all the players and better for one or more. If there are …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011109567
We introduce a new matching model to mimic two-sided exchange programs such as tuition and worker exchange, in which …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011297547
We introduce a new matching model to mimic two-sided exchange programs such as tuition and worker exchange, in which …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013036242