We use a simple graphical approach to represent Social Welfare Functions that satisfy Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Anonymity. This approach allows us to provide simple and illustrative proofs of May's Theorem, of variants of classic impossibility results, and of a recent result on...

We use a simple graphical approach to represent Social Welfare Functions that satisfy Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Anonymity. This approach allows us to provide simple and illustrative proofs of May's Theorem, of variants of classic impossibility results, and of a recent result on...

A buyer seeks to procure a good characterized by its price and its quality from suppliers who have private information about their cost structure (…xed cost and marginal cost of providing quality). We characterize the buyers optimal buying mechanism. We then use the optimal mechanism as a...

This paper describes open research questions related to the competition and market structure of financial exchanges and argues that only a combination of industrial organization and finance can satisfactorily attack these questions. Two examples are discussed to illustrate how the combination of...

This paper uses data consisting of students' strategically reported preferences and their underlying true preferences to study the course allocation mechanism used at Harvard Business School. We show that the mechanism is manipulable in theory, manipulated in practice, and that these...