We provide new characterization results for the value of games in partition function form. In particular, we use the potential of a game to define the value. We also provide a characterization of the class of values which satises one form of reduced game consistency.

We provide new characterization results for the value of games in partition function form. In particular, we use the potential of a game to define the value. We also provide a characterization of the class of values which satisfies one form of reduced game consistency.

We provide new characterization results for the value of games in partition function form. In particular, we use the potential of a game to dene the value. We also provide a characterization of the class of values which satises one form of reduced game consistency.

We propose a new cost allocation rule for minimum cost spanning tree games. The new rule is a core selection and also satis…es cost monotonicity. We also give characterization theorems for the new rule as well as the much-studied Bird allocation. We show that the principal di¤erence between...

We propose a new cost allocation rule for minimum cost Spanning tree games. The new rule is a core selection and also satisfices cost monotonicity. We also give charqcterization theorems for the new rule as well as the much-studied Bird allocation. We show that the principal difference between...

This work is a contribution, first, toward measuring rural institu- tions taking multidimensional networks of socio-economic interactions in villages as the primitive and then toward exploring impacts of such institutions on household-access to a public employment programme: MGNREGS in India....

We view achieving a particular correlated equilibrium distribution for a normal form game as an implementation problem. We show, using a parametric version of the two-person Chicken game and a wide class of correlated equilibrium distributions, that a social choice function that chooses a...