A risk neutral principal hires a risk averse agent to produce quality which is unobservable by the principal but generates a random stream of observable revenues. Unobservable effort and some other input called capital costs are perfect complements in the product at quality. The minimum level of...

This paper considers a successive oligopoly setting in which a set of upstream firms sell output non-exclusively to a group of downstream firms using a linear tariff. If the concavity of retail demand is constant then the profitability of horizontal merger at either the upstream or the...

This paper examines equilibrium in a market consisting of two sellers, each of whom produce one product which is horizontally (locationally) and vertically (qualitatively) differentiated, and many buyers. The sellers behave non-cooperatively and play a three-stage Nash game in location, quality...

We introduce intermediaries into the Brander-Spencer model of strategic trade policy. A key finding is that in regimes involving independent retailers, output competition and linear pricing (and two-part tariffs under certain restrictions) the optimal policy involves an export tax instead of a...