In a real option model, we show that the standard analysis of vertical relationships transposes directly to investment timing. Thus, when a firm undertaking a project requires an outside supplier (e.g., an equipment manufacturer) to provide it with a discrete input to serve a growing but...

This note further characterizes the tacit collusion equilibria in the investment timing game of Boyer, Lasserre and Moreaux [1]. Tacit collusion equilibria may or may not exist, and when they do may involve either finite time investments (type 1) or infinite delay (type 2). The relationship...

Collusion sustainability depends on firms' aptitude to impose suffciently severe punishments in case of deviation from the collusive rule. We characterize the ability of oligopolistic ï¬rms to implement a collusive strategy when their ability to punish deviations over one or several periods is...

In a real option model, we show that the standard analysis of vertical relationships transposes directly to investment timing. Thus, when a firm undertaking a project requires an outside supplier (e.g., an equipment manufacturer) to provide it with a discrete input to serve a growing but...

We characterize sequential (preemption) and simultaneous (coordination) equilibria, as well as joint-value maximizing (cooperation) solutions, in a model of investment timing allowing for externalities in both flow pro...ts and investment costs. For two ex-ante symmetric ...rms, either...

We study entry in a growing market by ex-ante symmetric duopolists when sunk costs differ for the innovating and imitating firm. Strategic competition takes the form either of a preemption race or of a war of attrition, the latter being likelier when demand uncertainty is high. Industry value is...

We show that the standard analysis of vertical relationships transposes directly to investment dynamics. Thus, when a firm undertaking a project requires an outside supplier (e.g., an equipment manufacturer) to provide it with a discrete input to serve a growing but uncertain demand, and if the...

An article about Kihlstrom and Mirman about comparative risk aversion with many goods is critiqued. If "more risk averse" is interpreted as signifying that an individual is less willing to accept a median-preserving spread, then risk aversion cannot be compared across individuals with different...

This paper investigates the combined impact of a first-mover advantage and of firmsí limited mobility on the equilibrium outcomes of a continuous-time model adapted from by Boyer, Lasserre, and Moreaux (2007). Two firms face market development uncertainty and may enter by investing in lumpy...