Gravelle shows that delay in legal process causes the costs of justice increase and reduces the demand for justice. In this work we test Gravelle's argument for Italy by analysing the relationship between the number of new appeals and the average delay in the corresponding disputes at first...

The article investigates the equilibrium conditions in the choice between legally binding contracts, which are costly to verify and enforce, and non-binding contracts, which simply rely on trust as an enforcement mechanism, in both one-shot and repeated interactions. The returns to effort appear...

Communication has been shown to play a positive role in promoting trust, yet there is no evidence on how sensitive this result is to the size of the gains from cooperation. To investigate this issue, we adopt an experimental design in which a trustee can send a free form message to a trustor,...

Gravelle (1990) has shown that delay works as measure of the excess of demand characterizing a judicial system. In this paper we adapt the Gravelle's argument to the Italian judicial system in order to verify whether it works, in the sense that delay discourages potential plaintiffs from...

The legal system can be treated as a large market where justice is traded in terms of legal disputes. Empirical evidence underlines that demand for legal assistance raises over time, despite high costs connected to filing, not only in Italy but also elsewhere in Europe. Moreover, the demand for...