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Bargaining and distribution of power in the EU's Conciliation Committee
Napel, Stefan; Widgrén, Mika - 2003
makers , understanding of the final stage of the procedure bargaining in the Conciliation Committee is crucial. Here, EP and … bargaining theory to predict inter-institutional agreements in the Conciliation Committee, it turns out that although …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011509443
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Bargaining and Distribution of Power in the EU's Conciliation Committee
Napel, Stefan; Widgrén, Mika - CESifo - 2003
makers’, understanding of the final stage of the procedure – bargaining in the Conciliation Committee – is crucial. Here, EP … bargaining theory to predict inter-institutional agreements in the Conciliation Committee, it turns out that although …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005765847
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The inter-institutional distribution of power in EU codecision
Napel, Stefan; Widgrén, Mika - 2004
indices, both institutions are assumed to act strategically. Predicted bargaining outcomes of the crucial Conciliation stage …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010284909
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The inter-institutional distribution of power in EU codecision
Napel, Stefan; Widgrén, Mika - 2004
indices, both institutions are assumed to act strategically. Predicted bargaining outcomes of the crucial Conciliation stage …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261094
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The Inter-Institutional Distribution of Power in EU Codecision
Napel, Stefan; Widgrén, Mika - CESifo - 2004
indices, both institutions are assumed to act strategically. Predicted bargaining outcomes of the crucial Conciliation stage …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094390
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The Inter-institutional Distribution of Power in EU Codecision
Napel, Stefan; Widgren, Mika - Elinkeinoelämän Tutkimuslaitos (ETLA) - 2004
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005700403
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Strategic Power Revisited
Napel, Stefan; Widgrén, Mika - 2002
Traditional power indices ignore preferences and strategic interaction. Equilibrium analysis of particular non-cooperative decision procedures is unsuitable for normative analysis and assumes typically unavailable information. These points drive a lingering debate about the right approach to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010315462
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Strategic power revisited
Napel, Stefan; Widgrén, Mika - 2002
Traditional power indices ignore preferences and strategic interaction. Equilibrium analysis of particular non-cooperative decision procedures is unsuitable for normative analysis and assumes typically unavailable information. These points drive a lingering debate about the right approach to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011410230
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Strategic Power Revisited
Napel, Stefan; Widgrén, Mika - CESifo - 2002
Traditional power indices ignore preferences and strategic interaction. Equilibrium analysis of particular non-cooperative decision procedures is unsuitable for normative analysis and assumes typically unavailable information. These points drive a lingering debate about the right approach to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005051518
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EU Conciliation Committee: Council 56 versus Parliament 6
Napel, Stefan; Widgrén, Mika - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003
This Paper analyses bargaining between the European Parliament (EP) and the Council of Ministers (CM) in the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114474