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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000682875
This paper examines the reasons why corruption and policy distortions tend to exhibit a high degree of persistence in certain regimes. We identify circumstances under which a firm seeks to evade regulations by (1) bribing of local inspectors, and (2) lobbying high-level government politicians to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014400451
For-profit hospitals in California contract out services much more intensely than either public hospitals or private nonprofit hospitals. To explain why, we build a model in which the outsourcing decision is a trade-off between net revenues and some nonmonetary benefit to the manager, which we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015246235
For-profit hospitals in California contract out services much more intensely than either private nonprofit or public hospitals. To explain why, we build a model in which the outsourcing decision is a trade-off between net revenues and some non-monetary benefit to the manager, or "bias" in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015250118
For-profit hospitals in California contract out services much more intensely than either public hospitals or private nonprofit hospitals. To explain why, we build a model in which the outsourcing decision is a trade-off between net revenues and some nonmonetary benefit to the manager, which we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011167234
In the behavioral industrial organization literature, market forces may not eliminate inefficiencies associated with biased consumers. Regulations usually exist that could, but we show that self-governing citizen-consumers will not always enact these welfare-improving policies. In a market for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014195263
In a system of divided power, public sector agencies are an important front in the day-to-day battle for political supremacy between the executive and the legislature. The executive's key agents in this conflict are his appointees, who are observed playing two broad roles: allies, where they...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014217461
This note empirically analyzes how partisan control of a state's legislature alters the growth of the state's tax burden. Using two related empirical strategies, one based on instrumental variables using closely controlled legislatures and one based on regression discontinuity, I find large...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014217471
For-profit hospitals in California contract out to a much greater extent than either public hospitals or private nonprofit hospitals. To explain why, we build a model in which the outsourcing decision is a trade-off between net revenues and “quality", any factor of interest to the hospital...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014161311
Why do bureaucratic principals appoint agents who hold different policy views from themselves? We posit an explanation based on the interplay between two types of agency costs: shirking on information production and policy bias. Principals employ biased agents because they shirk less. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014161869