This paper examines the reasons why corruption and policy distortions tend to exhibit a high degree of persistence in certain regimes. We identify circumstances under which a firm seeks to evade regulations by (1) bribing of local inspectors, and (2) lobbying high-level government politicians to...

For-profit hospitals in California contract out services much more intensely than either public hospitals or private nonprofit hospitals. To explain why, we build a model in which the outsourcing decision is a trade-off between net revenues and some nonmonetary benefit to the manager, which we...

For-profit hospitals in California contract out services much more intensely than either private nonprofit or public hospitals. To explain why, we build a model in which the outsourcing decision is a trade-off between net revenues and some non-monetary benefit to the manager, or "bias" in the...

For-profit hospitals in California contract out services much more intensely than either public hospitals or private nonprofit hospitals. To explain why, we build a model in which the outsourcing decision is a trade-off between net revenues and some nonmonetary benefit to the manager, which we...

In the behavioral industrial organization literature, market forces may not eliminate inefficiencies associated with biased consumers. Regulations usually exist that could, but we show that self-governing citizen-consumers will not always enact these welfare-improving policies. In a market for...

In a system of divided power, public sector agencies are an important front in the day-to-day battle for political supremacy between the executive and the legislature. The executive's key agents in this conflict are his appointees, who are observed playing two broad roles: allies, where they...

This note empirically analyzes how partisan control of a state's legislature alters the growth of the state's tax burden. Using two related empirical strategies, one based on instrumental variables using closely controlled legislatures and one based on regression discontinuity, I find large...

For-profit hospitals in California contract out to a much greater extent than either public hospitals or private nonprofit hospitals. To explain why, we build a model in which the outsourcing decision is a trade-off between net revenues and “quality", any factor of interest to the hospital...

Why do bureaucratic principals appoint agents who hold different policy views from themselves? We posit an explanation based on the interplay between two types of agency costs: shirking on information production and policy bias. Principals employ biased agents because they shirk less. This...