We investigate how costly acquisition and exchange of customer-specific information affects industry profit and consumer welfare. Consumers differ in their preferences for competing brands and in their switching costs between brands. Brand-producing firms use their acquired knowledge of...

We introduce three types of consumer recognition: identity recognition, asymmetric preference recognition, and symmetric preference recognition. We characterize price equilibria and compare profits, consumer surplus, and total welfare. Asymmetric preference recognition enhances profits compared...

We investigate how costly acquisition and exchange of customer-specific information affects industry profit and consumer welfare. Consumers differ in their preferences for competing brands and in their switching costs between brands. Brand-producing firms use their acquired knowledge of...

We introduce three types of consumer recognition: identity recognition, asymmetric preference recognition, and symmetric preference recognition. We characterize price equilibria and compare profits, consumer surplus, and total welfare. Asymmetric preference recognition enhances profits compared...

The two central pricing rules contained in most antirust laws are prohibitions of below-cost pricing and prohibitions of discriminatory pricing. This article shows that the rule against discriminatory pricing may actually induce firms to charge exclusionary below-cost prices, even in the...

This paper studies differential pricing by an upstream monopolist whose cost to supply the intermediate good differs across buyers in the downstream. It is shown that, different from third degree price discrimination based on the downstream firms' cost of transforming the intermediate good into...

This paper examines the effect of private label sold by one of two retailers (the “chain store”) on wholesale prices in the intermediate goods market. Under sym- metric retail costs, the chain store can make the wholesale price lower than its rival (the “local store”) when the private...

We analyze how different degrees of privacy protection affect industry profits, consumer welfare, and total welfare in a model with switching costs. Firms earn higher profits under weak privacy protection compared with strong or no privacy protection. The relationship between the degree of...

Price markups over marginal cost are often higher on "aftermarket" parts and services for durable goods than they are on the goods themselves. A popular explanation is that the aftermarket good is used as a "metering" device. This paper explores what happens in the metering model as foremarket...

This study characterizes the corporate leniency policy that minimizes the frequency with which collusion occurs. Though it can be optimal to provide only partial leniency, plausible sufficient conditions are provided whereby the antitrust authority should waive all penalties for the first firm...