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We define the canonical form of a cost spanning tree problem. The canonical form has the property that reducing the cost of any arc, the minimal cost of connecting agents to the source is also reduced. We argue that the canonical form is a relevant concept in this kind of problems and study a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005230826
We define the canonical form of a cost spanning tree problem. The canonical form has the property that reducing the cost of any arc, the minimal cost of connecting agents to the source is also reduced. We argue that the canonical form is a relevant concept in this kind of problems and study a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011603467
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002403171
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003396192
A power measure is monotone if a player with a larger weight is assigned at least as much power as a player with a smaller weight in the same weighted majority game. Failure of a power index to satisfy monotonicity is often considered a pathological feature. In this paper, we show that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009535529
We study a majoritarian bargaining model in which the parties make payoff demands in decreasing order of voting weight. If the game is constant-sum and homogeneous, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium is such that the minimal winning coalition of the players who move first forms and payoffs...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003407857
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013450529
They provide a characterization of the obligation rules in the context of minimum cost spanning tree games. They also explore the relation between obligation rules and random order values of their reducible cost game - it is shown that the later is a subset of the obligation rules. Moreover we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008677794
We study how to partition a set of agents in a stable way when each coalition in the partition has to share a unit of a perfectly divisible good, and each agent has symmetric single-peaked preferences on the unit interval of his potential shares. A rule on the set of preference profiles consists...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851353
The division problem under constraints consists of allocating a given amount of an homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a subset of agents with single-peaked preferences on an exogenously given interval of feasible allotments. We characterize axiomatically the family of extended...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010851412