This paper studies how information control affects incentives for collusion and optimal organizational structures in principal-supervisor-agent relationships. I consider a model in which the principal designs the supervisor's signal on the productive agent's private information and the...

This paper studies the welfare effects of wholesale price discrimination between downstream firms operating under different regulatory systems. I model a monopolistic intermediate good market in which production cost differences between downstream firms may be due to regulatory or technological...

This paper studies optimal contracts and monitoring policies in procurement under dynamic adverse selection and moral hazard concerning a cost-reducing investment decision. I assume fixed costs of investment and show that the resulting 'lumpy' investment behavior creates a motive to monitor...

This paper studies optimal information disclosure under the threat of collusion. A principal seeks to procure a good from one of two agents who can collude against the principal. The first agent has a publicly known cost of production and the second agent's cost is his private information. The...

This paper studies how information control affects incentives for collusion and optimal organizational structures in principal-supervisor-agent relationships. I consider a model in which the principal designs the supervisor's signal on the productive agent's private information and the...

This paper studies information orders in screening models with quasilinear preferences. I amend a general screening problem with a public signal about the agent's type and provide robust rankings of signals from the principal's perspective. The principal prefers one signal to another for any...

This paper studies how certification design is affected by the objective of the designer. Our model features a profit-maximizing certifier offering his services to the seller of a good of unknown quality. We allow for common values as the seller’s cost may depend on the quality of the good. We...