We consider a Sender-Receiver game in which the Sender can choose between sending a cheap-talk message, which is costless, but also not verified and a costly verified message. While the Sender knows the true state of the world, the Receiver does not have this information, but has to choose an...

Large investors often advertise private information at private talks or in the media. To analyse the incentives for information disclosure, I develop a two-period Kyle (1985) type model in which an informed short-horizon investor strategically discloses private information to enhance price...

Companies are under an increasing pressure by policy makers to publicize data breaches. Such notification obligations require announcing the loss of personal data collected from customers, because of hacker attacks or other incidents. While notification is likely to impact on firms’...

Recent studies, starting with Hanley Weiss and Hoberg (2010), have used textual analysis to document that voluntary disclosure of information in IPO prospectuses is associated with lower IPO underpricing. We employ an alternative measure and model the issuer's choice of information disclosure,...

We consider a standard persuasion problem in which the receiver’s action and the state of the world are both one-dimensional. Fully characterizing optimal signals when utilities are non-linear is a daunting task. Instead, we develop a general approach to understanding a key qualitative...

FASB Interpretation No. 48 (FIN 48) requires firms to disclose a forecast of significant changes in unrecognized tax benefits (UTBs) that are reasonably possible to occur within 12 months of the reporting date. According to paragraph 21(d), the “look-forward” disclosure, a firm must disclose...

Companies in Europe and the US are required to explain the significant risk factors they face in their annual reports. Prior studies provide mixed evidence of the informativeness of such textual risk disclosures, suggesting that these disclosures are an amalgam of both boilerplate and...