One technique employed by budget-conscious researchers is to pay only some of the subjects for their choices in an experiment. We test the effect of paying some subjects versus paying all subjects in the context of risk preferences, controlling for the difference in stakes induced by paying only...

We investigate the relationship between collusive behavior in Bertrand oligopoly experiments and subject heterogeneity in risk preferences. We find that risk aversion is positively associated with tacit collusion when the goods are complements, but find no evidence of collusive behavior when the...

We experimentally test a rent seeking model under five levels of competition. At one extreme, a subject’s probability of winning a prize is equal to her share of the total expenditures. At lower levels of competition, a subject’s probability of winning is affected more by her own...

We study the effect of demand structure on the ability of subjects to tacitly collude on prices by considering Bertrand substitutes and Bertrand complements. We find evidence of collusion in the complements treatment, but no such evidence in the substitutes treatment. This finding is somewhat in...

This paper outlines a classroom experiment that complements the standard theoretical discussion of Hotelling's (1929) spatial competition model. The exercise provides students with a deeper understanding of the intuition behind competitive clustering, resolving the Bertrand paradox, and product...

One technique employed by budget-conscious researchers is to pay only some of the subjects for their choices in an experiment. We test the effect of paying some subjects versus paying all subjects in the context of risk preferences, controlling for the difference in stakes induced by paying only...