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This paper studies the design of optimal contracts in dynamic environments where agents learn by doing. We derive a condition under which contracts are fully incentive compatible. A closed-form solution is obtained when agents have CARA utility. It shows that human capital accumulation...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010246654
We examine the implementation of efficient decisions about accepting a special order with asymmetric information by means of a dual transfer pricing mechanism based on Ronen and McKinney (1970). The model is designed in a simple fashion, two vertically related divisions within a firm...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010494194
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011685315
We extend the theoretical model of external corporate financing to the case when the buyers of the borrowing firm may default during the financing period. In our setup there is an asymmetric information and hence moral hazard between the lender and the borrower concerning the effrts of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009773078
The probability that actors in economic relationships break rules increases with the profits they thus expect to earn. It decreases with the probability and level of short- and long-term losses resulting from disclosure. It also decreases with the level of social context factors and intrinsic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010346444
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012594150
This paper explores how governments may efficiently inform the public about an epidemic to induce compliance with their confinement measures. Using an information design framework, we find the government has an incentive to either downplay or exaggerate the severity of the epidemic if it heavily...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012430271
This paper explores how governments may efficiently inform the public about an epidemic to induce compliance with their confinement measures. Using an information design framework, we find that governments have an incentive to either downplay or exaggerate the severity of the epidemic if the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012385240
This paper explores how governments may efficiently inform the public about an epidemic to induce compliance with their confinement measures. Using an information design framework, we find the government has an incentive to either downplay or exaggerate the severity of the epidemic if it heavily...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012425046
This paper establishes the existence of relaxed solutions to mean eld games (MFGs for short) with singular controls. As a by-product, we obtain an existence of relaxed solutions results for McKean-Vlasov stochastic singular control problems. Finally, we prove approximations of solutions results...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011626609