We study a continuous-time game of strategic experimentation in which the players try to assess the failure rate of some new equipment or technology. Breakdowns occur at the jump times of a Poisson process whose unknown intensity is either high or low. In marked contrast to existing models, we...

We study the evolution of prices in a symmetric duopoly where firms are uncertain about the degree of product differentiation. Customers sometimes perceive the products as close substitutes, sometimes as highly differentiated. Firms learn about their competitive environment from the quantities...

This paper studies optimal experimentation by a monopolist who faces an unknown demand curve subject to random changes, and who maximises profits over an infinite horizon in continuous time. We show that there are two qualitatively very different regimes, determined by the discount rate and the...

This paper studies a game of strategic experimentation with two-armed bandits where the risky arm distributes lump-sum payoffs according to a Poisson process. The intensity of this process is either high or low, and unknown to the players. We consider Markov perfect equilibria with beliefs as...

We analyze continuous-time games of strategic experimentation with two-armedbandits when there is no discounting. We show that for all specifications of priorbeliefs and payoff-generating processes that satisfy some separability condition, the unique symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium can be...

We study the evolution of prices in a symmetric duopoly where firms are uncertain about the degree of product differentiation. Customers sometimes perceive the products as close substitutes, sometimes as highly differentiated. Firms learn about their competitive environment from the quantities...

We study a continuous-time game of strategic experimentation in which the players try to assess the failure rate of some new equipment or technology. Breakdowns occur at the jump times of a Poisson process whose unknown intensity is either high or low. In marked contrast to existing models, we...

This paper studies a game of strategic experimentation in which the players have access to two-armed bandits where the risky arm distributes lumpsum payoffs according to a Poisson process with unknown intensity. Because of free-riding, there is an inefficiently low level of experimentation in...

This paper studies a game of strategic experimentation in which the players learn from the experiments of others as well as their own. <br> We first establish the efficient benchmark where the players co-ordinate in order to maximise joint expected payoffs, and then show that, because of...