Consider a ride sharing platform, and a large population of strategic potential drivers, heterogeneous in terms of their reservation wages (i.e., income goals). Drivers choose whether or not to work for the platform. The platform is assumed knowledgeable of the different drivers' reservation...

We introduce a game in which a firm offers service at a price to a set of potential customers, who choose whether or not to consume it, and if so, how much to tip the server after having received service. By tipping, customers wish to signal their appreciation for the server, but also wish to...

This paper considers a monopoly firm (carrier) that charges a uniform price to passengers. Passengers are delay-sensitive and hence demand rates depend on waiting times. The carrier can choose to reveal or hide waiting time information. We show that optimal information strategies depend on the...

Problem definition: We consider a service system in which customers must travel to the queue to be served. In our base model, customers observe the queue length and then decide whether to travel. We also consider alternative information models and investigate how the availability of queue-length...

We consider a general queueing model with a Poisson arrival process whose rate is random, and realized once for the entire process. We show that the distribution of the arrival rate at arrival instants is the size-biased counterpart of the original distribution. In particular, the ASTA (arrivals...

"Rational Queueing provides one of the first unified accounts of the dynamic aspects involved in the strategic behavior in queues. It explores the performance of queueing systems where multiple agents, such as customers, servers, and central managers, all act but often in a noncooperative...