As a part of their industry or competition policies governments decide whether to allow for free market entry of firms or to regulate market access. We analyze a model where governments (ab)use these policy decisions for strategic reasons in an international setting. Multiple equilibria of this...

Recent high natural gas prices have focused attention on competition in European gas markets. In response to anti-trust pressures, many long-term pipeline gas contracts in Europe have shifted from oil-linked indexation to pricing based on traded European gas hub indices. In this short paper I...

In some markets vertically integrated firms sell directly to final customers hut also to independent downstream firms with whom they then compete on the downstream market. It is often argued that resellers intensify competition and benefit consumers, in particular when wholesale prices are...

As a part of their industry or competition policies governments decide whether to allow for free market entry of firms or to regulate market access. We analyze a model where governments (ab)use these policy decisions for strategic reasons in an international setting. Multiple equilibria of this...

We model how individuals and firms adapt beliefs, heuristics, mental frameworks and norms to changed circumstances. Adaptation competes with other work for limited mental resources. We apply our model to firms experiencing a technology shock. It is optimal for some firms to disband rather than...

Are dominant online search engines monopolies enjoying low contest-ability, due to high barriers to entry, or innovative first-movers? This paper argues that dominant online search engines maintain their leadership through an “innovation feedback loop”: a process whereby increasing R&D...

Pricing algorithms are rapidly transforming markets, from ride-sharing apps, to air travel, to online retail. Regulators and scholars have watched this development with a wary eye. Their focus so far has been on the potential for pricing algorithms to facilitate explicit and tacit collusion....

We here want to analyze how the imperfect competition mark-up and pass-through are transmitted through the production chain and how they change, as a function of the number of firms existing at each production stage. In order to have an analytical closed form solution, we use the standard linear...

We consider a Cournot oligopoly market of firms possessing increasing returns to scale technologies (which may not be identical). It is shown that an external regulating agency can increase total social welfare without running a deficit by of ering to subsidize one firm an amount which depends...