This dissertation consists of two essays on the topic of bidding in multi-unit common value auction. Essay one examines the role of capacity constraint on the auction results and bidding behavior. We consider a general case where bidders are unconstrained, and a second setting where bidders are...

We analyze pre and post-task confidence in an experiment in which subjects bid in multi-unit common value auctions. Subjects return for a second session, so we are able to assess how performance affects the evolution of confidence. Those with low confidence prior to the first session...

An experimental approach is used to examine the performance of three different multi-unit auction designs: discriminatory, uniform-price with fixed supply, and uniform-price with endogenous supply. We find that the strategies of the individual bidders and the aggregate demand curves are...

Empirical studies of asset markets and a growing experimental literature suggest that in many cases competing dealers earn some monopoly rents: they do not arrive at a Bertrand equilibrium. In spite of this, little attention has been paid to the competitive forces that impinge on dealers'...

An experimental approach is used to examine the performance of three different multi-unit auction designs: discriminatory, uniform-price with fixed supply, and uniform-price with endogenous supply. We find that the strategies of the individual bidders and the aggregate demand curves are...

An experimental approach is used to examine the performance of three different multi-unit auction designs: discriminatory, uniform-price with fixed supply, and uniform-price with endogenous supply. We find that the strategies of the individual bidders and the aggregate demand curves are...

An experimental approach is used to examine the performance of three different multiunit auction designs: discriminatory, uniform-price with fixed supply, and uniform-price with endogenous supply. We find the actual strategies to be inconsistent with theoretically identified equilibrium...

We show that asymmetry in bidders' capacity constraints plays an important role in inhibiting collusion and promoting competitive outcomes in multi-unit common value auctions. This effect seems to be related to the increased difficulty of coordination when there are fundamental differences...