In this paper we propose an electoral model that studies the interaction between the distribution of voters ideal policies and the success of dynastic politicians. Electoral success of politicians depends on their ability to implement better policies for the voters because campaign promises are...

Focusing on former university classmates among corporate directors and U.S. congressmen, and the regression discontinuity design of close Congress elections from 2000 to 2008, we provide robust evidence of the causal impact of social-network based political connections on firm value. The value...

Using a proprietary dataset of initial coin offerings (ICOs) and cryptocurrencies, we systematically examine whether disclosure quality, governance mechanisms, and team quality can differentiate legitimate ICO projects from fraudulent ones. The three fundamental factors positively affect ICO...

The Dodd-Frank Act (Section 939B) enacted in 2010 repealed credit rating agencies' (CRAs) exemption from Regulation Fair Disclosure. Testing whether CRAs continue to provide new information to the market after the repeal, we find that the significant pre-repeal stock price responses to rating...

The external networks of directors significantly impact firm value and decisions. Surrounding close gubernatorial elections, local firms with directors connected to winners increase value by 4.1% over firms connected to losers. Director network's value increases with network strength and...

Payout policies based on share repurchase programs provide greater flexibility than do those based on cash dividends. We develop and test an empirical model in which strongly-governed companies outperform weakly-governed companies after announcing share repurchase programs. Our findings include...

This study examines the informational role of credit watch placements in the overall bond rating process. We show that the act of a company's bond being put on a credit watch is, in itself, associated with significant abnormal returns in the company's stock and bond rating revision that are...

Using the regression discontinuity design of close gubernatorial elections in the U.S., we identify a significant and positive impact of the social networks of corporate directors and politicians on firm value. Firms connected to elected governors increase their value by 3.89%. Political...

Does higher office always lead to more favoritism? We argue that firms may lose their benefit from a connected politicians ascent to higher office, if it entails stricter scrutiny that may reduce favoritism. Around close Congress elections, we find RDD-based evidence of this adverse effect that...