We consider a committee that consists of n members with one person one vote approving a proposal if the number of affirmative votes from the members reaches threshold k. Which threshold k between 1 and n is "good" for the committee? We suppose that if a new threshold k' proposed by some...

This paper considers the solutions of cooperative games with a fixed player set that admit a potential function. We say that a solution admits a potential function if the solution is given as the marginal contribution according to the potential function. Hart and Mas-Collel (1989) show that the...

Our objective is to analyze the relationship between the Shapley value and the core of cooperative games with transferable utility. We first characterize balanced games, i.e., the set of games with a nonempty core, through geometric properties. We show that the set of balanced games generates a...

Different principles of distributive justice may result in different allocations of economic resources and surpluses across members of groups. This paper proposes a new class of allocation rules, called the group-wise egalitarian Owen values that integrates two seemingly conflicting...

This paper extends the Cournot-Shapiro model to provide a tractable model of voluntary patent pool formation among standard essential patent holders. We assume that patent holders have complementary patents for a standard. We first show that the existence of a path of voluntary patent pool...