We determine the optimal policy to cope with information concealment in a hierarchy where a principal relies on a supervisor to obtain verifiable information about an agent's output. Depending on the information he has obtained, the informed supervisor may either collude with the agent or with...

To control, evaluate, and motivate their agents, firms employ supervisors. As shown by empirical investigations, biased evaluation by supervisors linked to collusion is a persistent feature of firms. This paper studies how deceptive supervision affects agency relationships. We consider a...

This paper studies organizations with autocratic decisionmaking.

This paper examines the impact of investments in modernization and innovation on productivity in a sample of firms in the global pulp and paper industry. This industry is important because it has traditionally accounted for significant amounts of employment and capital investment in North...

Based on diverse research methods, we trace and map industrial economics research in Denmark, Norway and Sweden in the periode of 1880 to 1908. After describing this research in terms of key contributors, we argue that industrial economics developed rather unevenly in the Scandinavian countries....

R&D cooperation has received great attention among industrialists, decision makers and researchers as it facilitates research collaboration, information sharing, reduced R&D cost, and affects R&D resource allocation, advancement and competitiveness of the national industry, employment and...

This paper studies organizations with autocratic decisionmaking, i.e., where superiors make the decisions and subordinates either defy or submit to the authority. Superiors differ in the degree to which they fear defiance. The superiors who need obedience most face a fundamental credibility...

Groups, companies, and organizations identify themselves via symbols. Symbols have the potential to create group identity and at the same time create group boundaries, thus allowing for achieving the benefits of cooperation by ingroup members. We use a laboratory experiment to study the role of...

The financial crisis has revealed fatal institutional and structural deficits at the finance market. Politics has reacted to the financial crisis with a sea of legal bills and regulations. But all regulating efforts are merely system-imminent reparation measures and do not solve the core...

We study whether group identity helps mitigate inefficiencies associated with appropriable quasi-rents, which are often created by relationship-specific investments in bilateral trade relationships. Based on previous findings that group identity strengthens other-regarding preferences, we...