Naor's (1969) celebrated paper studies customer decisions in an observable M/M/1 queue where joining-customers utility is linearly decreasing with the joining position. Naor derives the optimal threshold strategies for the individuals, social planner and monopolist, and proves the monopoly...

We introduce a game in which a firm offers service at a price to a set of potential customers, who choose whether or not to consume it, and if so, how much to tip the server after having received service. By tipping, customers wish to signal their appreciation for the server, but also wish to...

We study the dynamic pricing problem of a monopolist firm in presence of strategic customers that differ in their valuations and risk preferences. We show that this problem can be formulated as a static mechanism design problem, which is more amenable to analysis. We highlight several structural...

Traditional monopoly pricing models assume that firms have full information about the market demand and consumer preferences. In this article, we study a prototypical monopoly pricing problem for a seller with limited market information and different levels of demand learning capability under...

We consider a revenue maximizing make-to-order manufacturer that serves a market of price and delay sensitive customers and operates in an environment in which the market size varies stochastically over time. A key feature of our analysis is that no model is assumed for the evolution of the...

This chapter reviews multi-product dynamic pricing models for a revenue maximizing monopolist firm. The baseline model studied in this chapter is of a seller that owns a fixed capacity of a resource that is consumed in the production or delivery of some type of product. The seller selects a...

Traditional monopoly pricing models assume that firms have full information about the market demand and consumer preferences. In this paper we study a prototypical monopoly pricing problem for a seller with limited market information and different levels of demand learning capability under...

We study an aggregated marketplace where potential buyers arrive and submit requests-for-quotes (RFQs). There are n independent suppliers modelled as M=GI=1 queues that compete for these requests. Each supplier submits a bid that comprises of a fixed price and a dynamic target leadtime, and the...

We propose a tractable, data-driven demand estimation procedure based on the use maximum entropy (ME) distributions, and apply it a stochastic capacity control problem motivated from airline revenue management. Specifically, we study the two fare-class "Littlewood" problem in a setting where the...