Given the current stalemate of international negotiations on climate change, with no global agreement at the horizon, we evaluate the possibility of a special partial agreement with only a subset of countries ratifying a treaty. In this framework, the non-signatory countries can decide to join...

Our purpose is to analyse the effectiveness and efficiency of a Partial Climate Agreement with open entry under a non-cooperative Nash-Equilibrium framework. We evaluate a partial agreement policy in which non-signatory countries can decide to join or to leave a coalition of the willing at any...

In this paper, we discuss the endogenous formation of climate coalitions in an issue-linkage regime. In particular, we propose to build a link to the issue of preferential free trade. Trade privileges exclusively granted to members of the climate coalition work as an incentive mechanism for...

The present paper analyzes the impact of a climate coalition's border carbon adjustment on emissions from commodity production, welfare and the coalition size. The coalition implements border carbon adjustment to reduce carbon leakage and to improve its terms of trade, while the fringe abstains...

In this paper, we discuss the endogenous formation of climate coalitions in the tradition of the issue-linkage literature. In particular, we propose a preferential free trade agreement on which a climate coalition should be built. The basic idea is that the benefits of free trade provide strong...

We study the endogenous formation of climate coalitions linked to a preferential free trade arrangement. In a multi-stage strategic trade and participation game, coalition and fringe countries dispose of a discriminatory tariff on dirty imports as well as emission permits imposed on domestic...

Cooperation in international environmental agreements appears difficult to attain because of strong free riding incentives. This paper explores how different technology spillover mechanisms among regions can influence the incentive structures to join and stabilize an international agreement. We...

This paper examines the climate change treaties with cooperative R&D that brings about substantial reduction in greenhouse gas emission. By developing a joiner's gain function, we present a new approach under which countries that have invested in R&D can recover their R&D costs by breakthrough...

We investigate whether global cooperation for emission abatement can be improved if asymmetric countries can sign different parallel environmental agreements. The analysis assumes a two-stage game theoretical model. Conditions for self-enforcing sets of agreements and the resulting total...