We study the problem of an organization that has a large number of potential tasks and has to choose which tasks to handle and which pair of experts assign to each of them. We propose a mechanism that generates a Pareto-efficient assignment in the weak core and is group strategy-proof. The...

We propose a simple model in which agents are matched in pairs in order to complete a task of unit size. The preferences of agents are single-peaked and continuous on the amount of time they devote to it. Our model combines features of two models: assignment games (Shapley and Shubik (1971)) and...

When preferences are single-peaked (Black (1948),Black et al. (1958)) or group separable Ballester and Haeringer (2011), majority voting equilibria exist. Group separability has probably not received as much attention as single-peak separability because there are no intuitive assumptions about...

We propose a model of sharing of public services among local governments. Our model is an application of Nicolo et al. (2023) and combines features of two models: assignment games (Shapley and Shubik (1971)) and the division problem (Sprumont (1991)). We provide an algorithm (The Simple SAM)...

We study rotation programs within the standard implementation framework under complete information. A rotation program is a myopic stable set whose states are arranged circularly, and agents can effectively move only between two consecutive states. We provide characterizing conditions for the...

This paper examines capacity-constrained oligopoly pricing with sellers who seekmyopic improvements. We employ the Myopic Stable Set solution concept and establish the existence of a unique pure-strategy price solution for any given level of capacity. This solution is shown to coincide with the...

Research on collusion in vertically differentiated markets is conducted under one or two potentially restrictive assumptions. Either there is a single industry-wide cartel or costs are assumed to be independent of quality or quantity. We explore the extent to which these assumptions are indeed...

We introduce a new solution concept for models of coalition formation, called the myopic stable set. The myopic stable set is defined for a very general class of social environments and allows for an infinite state space. We show that the myopic stable set exists and is non-empty. Under minor...

This paper examines capacity-constrained oligopoly pricing with sellers who seek myopic improvements. We employ the Myopic Stable Set solution concept and establish the existence of a unique pure-strategy price solution for any given level of capacity. This solution is shown to coincide with the...

We introduce a new solution concept for models of coalition formation, called the myopic stable set. The myopic stable set is defined for a very general class of social environments and allows for an infinite state space. We show that the myopic stable set exists and is non-empty. Under minor...