We assume that students can acquire a wage premium, thanks to studies, and form a rational expectation of their future … earnings, which depends on personal ability. Students receive a private, noisy signal of their ability, and universities can … of test scores. Students optimally self-select as a result of pricing only. If capital markets are perfect but …

We assume that students can acquire a wage premium, thanks to studies, and form a rational expectation of their future … earnings, which depends on personal "ability". Students receive a private, noisy signal of their ability, and universities can … of test scores. Students optimally self-select as a result of pricing only. If capital markets are perfect but …

Quotas for special groups of students often apply in school or university admission procedures. This paper studies the … quota for top-grade students before allocating all other seats among remaining applicants. The second is a modified version … main result is that the current procedure, designed to give top-grade students an advantage, actually harms them, as …

matching mechanism that is strategyproof for students. n the context of the German admissions problem, this mechanism weakly …

We develop a decentralized Bayesian model of college admissions with two ranked colleges, heterogeneous students and … two realistic match frictions: students find it costly to apply to college, and college evaluations of their applications … is uncertain. Students thus face a portfolio choice problem in their application decision, while colleges choose …

students, however it distorts incentives towards educational investments. Using the model at calibrated parameters, we quantify …