This dissertation includes two essays on adverse selection and moral hazard problems in reinsurance markets. The first essay builds a competitive principal-agent model that considers adverse selection and moral hazard jointly, and characterizes graphically various forms of separating Nash...

This dissertation considers three topics in professional advising and forecasting. Chapter 1 examines a principal's optimal contracting with experts. In an environment where experts have heterogeneous private signal distributions and type dependent reservation utilities, we show that the...

The marketing and operations management arms in a firm must work in coordination – marketing efforts to create demand go to waste if supply is suboptimal, and vice versa. However, achieving this coordination has remained a long-standing problem, because in most firms these units are managed in...

Two complementary sources of information are studied in a multiperiod agency model. One is an accounting source which partially but credibly conveys the agent’s private information through accounting recognition. The other is an unverified communication by the agent (i.e., a self-report). In a...

Agency theory is one of the principal frameworks utilized in explaining the family business phenomena. The objectives of this dissertation are to (1) identify the unique agent-principal dynamics that differentiate family firms from non-family firms, (2) determine the effects of these unique...

We suggest in this paper one of the reasons that researchers concur agency costs in family firms are more complex than originally thought maybe related to the lack of conceptual clarity. This, we propose, is because when frameworks and theories are borrowed and enthusiastically embraced without...

We extend agency theory to propose that structural reform positively impacts firm profitability in developing countries because the improvements in external monitoring that accompany structural reform decrease the agency costs faced by firms. However, we also argue that not all firms benefit...

We conduct an experiment to examine how lending decisions are affected by lender perceptions of reporting and governance quality. We perform a set of experiments to determine whether lenders are sensitive to the quality of governance as measured by board composition along multiple dimensions,...

Der vorliegende Beitrag befasst sich mit dem Zusammenwirken von zwei externen Effekten, die jeweils für sich eine effiziente Kapitalallokation behindern können.Zum Einen geht es darum, dass unter Umständen an sich Erfolg versprechende Investitionsgelegenheiten nur deswegen nicht realisiert...