The rapid growth of Distributed Energy Resources (DER) and their integration into network presents currently the greatest challenges for many network operators worldwide in terms of network stability and power quality. To meet these challenges not only huge investment in grid expansion and smart...

Despite monopolistic networks and in contrast to all other EUmember states, the electricity supply industry in Germany is not ex ante regulated. Control of the sector is left to the cartel agency, which can apply the essential- facilities doctrine as an ex-post instrument. This paper analyses...

This paper analyses price structures in the liberalized German market for long-distance telecommunications services. Theoretically deduced patterns are backed-up by empirical observations. The market is exceptionally competitive; entry is taking place on a large scale and prices are falling...

This paper compares two regulatory devices for handling (access to) bottlenecks in deregulated network industries: (1) a local price cap and (2) a global price cap, the latter of which applies the efficient component pricing rule. The local price cap restricts profit regulation to the...

In Deutschland wird derzeit die Ausgestaltung der Anreizregulierungsverordnung für Energienetze für die dritte Regulierungsperiode (ab 2019) diskutiert. Im Kern steht der sachgerechte Umgang mit dem hohen Investitionsbedarf, vor dem viele Netzbetreiber stehen. Die preisbasierte...

Market design for electricity often ignores network congestion initially and addresses it in a second, so-called 'redispatch' stage. For market participants, any two-stage design offers an opportunity to strategically optimize between the different market stages. The current debate is how to...

Mit der zunehmenden Dezentralisierung und Digitalisierung der Stromversorgung steigt auch der Bedarf an Innovationen im regulatorischen Rahmen, um die institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen an die sich ändernden Anforderungen anzupassen. Die SINTEGVerordnung und analoge Ansätze für Reallabore...

In recent years, the OPEX-CAPEX-incentive-bias (short: CAPEX-bias) received renewed attention in regulatory practice. A CAPEX-bias occurs when the OPEX solution is the more efficient approach, but regulation sets distorted incentives to choose the CAPEX solution. This paper presents a promising...

This paper presents an approach for resilience incentives in the regulation of electricity network operators. Resilience is the ability of the power system to deal quickly and efficiently with large-scale and long-lasting power interruptions. It comprises two related aspects: minimizing the...

This article presents an approach to minimize the outage costs during power supply disruptions and, thus, to incentivize efficient resilience investment by network users. The central problem to be solved is the information asymmetry between network operators and network users on outage and...