The paper models duopolistic competition in so called monotowns: towns with one big factory where most of the citizens are employed. Workers after job go to one of the competitor shops, buy the product and bring it home. Nash equilibrium is found for linear and two-dimensional cases. The...

In this paper the standard Hotelling model with quadratic transport costs is extended to the multi-firm case. The sequential game consists of a location choice stage and a price setting stage. Considering locational equilibria it is shown that neither holds the Principle of Maximum...

We develop a product-differentiated model where the product space is a network defined as a set of varieties (nodes) linked by their degrees of substitutability (edges). We also locate consumers into this network, so that the location of each consumer (node) corresponds to her "ideal" variety....

Electricity systems are increasingly characterized by distributed generation technologies, e.g. rooftop photovoltaic systems, which are used by end consumers to directly produce electricity. Additionally, empirical evidence suggests that electricity retailers exercise market power in many...

We study a two-period model of behavior-based price discrimination in Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) but allow firms to make product choice in the first period. We show that the only possible equilibrium involves maximal differentiation. This is in contrast to Choe et al. (2018) where equilibrium...

In Hotelling's fundamental model (1929), the geographical distance and high transportation costs grant firms present in a market a certain power over local buyers in their neighborhoods. Starting from his model, this study shows that in the competition between a bank and a microfinance...

In a spatial competition setting there is usually a non-negative relationship between competition and quality. In this paper we offer a novel mechanism whereby competition leads to lower quality. This mechanism relies on two key assumptions, namely that the providers are motivated and...

We show that the entry of a second firm in a horizontally differentiated market (ala Hotelling) may harm consumers as prices increase and consumer's surplus possibly decrease. We first derive the price and the consumer's surplus of a monopoly which is located at the center of the market. When a...

We investigate private and social incentives for standardization to ensure market-wide system compatibility in a two-dimensional spatial competition model. We develop a new methodology to analyze competition on a torus and show that there is a fundamental conflict of interest between consumers...

The paper studies indirect network effects in a market composed by two incompatible intermediaries that choose price (short-term issue) in addition to location (long-term issue). The paper first shows that (i) when the network externality is sufficiently weak, only maximum differentiation...