Showing 1 - 10 of 2,883
characterize the core as a function of the utility's parameter values and show that in all cases the corresponding cores are non …-empty. We further discuss the core stable outcomes in terms of their segregating versus integrating properties. -- Coalitions … ; Core ; Stability ; Status-seeking …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008737786
We provide a new proof of the non-emptiness of approximate cores of games with many players of a finite number of types. Earlier papers in the literature proceed by showing that, for games with many players, equal-treatment cores of their "balanced cover games", which are non-empty, can be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010472889
coalition forms without delay in equilibrium, expected payoffs must be in the core of the characteristic function game that …This paper studies an extensive form game of coalition formation with random proposers in games with externalities. It … strong condition, the equilibrium coalition structure is not necessarily efficient. There may be multiple equilibria even in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012650908
property which induces a rich domain on players's preferences in hedonic games, and guarantees the existence of core stable … partitions. We strengthen this observation by proving the existence of strict core stable partitions, and when a mutuality … condition is imposed as well, the existence of Nash stable partitions. -- Coalition formation ; Nash stability ; Partitions …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003731618
models of coalition formation:• Fallback (FB): Players seek coalition partners by descending lower and lower in their … preference rankings until a majority coalition forms.• Build-Up (BU): Similar to FB, except that when nonmajority subcoalitions … convergence process.FB better reflects the unconstrained, or nonmyopic, possibilities of coalition formation, whereas BU - because …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011596316
Experiments evaluate the fit of human behaviour to the Shapley-Shubik power index (SSPI), a formula of voter power. Groups of six subjects with differing votes divide a fixed purse by majority rule in online chat rooms. Earnings proxy for measured power. Chat rooms and processes for selecting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009789971
We introduce a noncooperative multilateral bargaining model for a network-restricted environment, in which players can communicate only with their neighbors. Each player strategically chooses the bargaining partners among the neighbors to buy out their communication links with upfront transfers....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011279698
Pairing Games or Markets studied here are the non-two-sided NTU generalization of assignment games. We show that the Equilibrium Set is nonempty, that it is the set of stable allocations or the set of semistable allocations, and that it has several notable structural properties. We also...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010350435
(weak) core, unlike in many-to-one matching markets (Blair, 1988). In this paper, we seek a theoretical foundation for … show the equivalence between the set of pairwise stable matchings and the set of matchings generated by coalition …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011593632
Human development is about expanding the choices human beings have to lead lives that they value and is captured by its capability sets which consist of various functioning vectors. The standard of living is then reflected in capability sets. This paper proposes some particular ways of measuring...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003214274