This paper explores the impact of debarment as a deterrent of collusion in first-price procurement auctions. We develop … a procurement auction model where bidders can form bidding rings, and derive the bidding and collusive behavior under no … both reduce collusion and bids. The deterrent effect of debarment increases in its length. However, the debarment of …

We contribute to the literature on the optimal design of auction mechanisms for the procurement of nature conservation … decreases with repetition. Theory predicts that repetition facilitates collusion among sellers in procurement auctions, while …

This paper studies the interaction between financially constrained and financially strong firms on a procurement market …. It characterizes and discusses a procurement agency's optimal response when faced with financially asymmetric firms. By …

’ bid. Equilibrium behavior in the first-price auction is mostly unaffected but there are multiple equilibria in the second …- price auction. Consequently, comparative statics across price rules are equivocal. Experimentally, leaks in the first- price … auction favor second movers but harm first movers and sellers, as theoretically predicted. Low to medium leak probabilities …