We analyze the optimal tax choices of a revenue-maximizing government that levies taxes from firms of which the true degree of mobility is ex ante unknown. Differential tax treatment of immobile and mobile firms is ruled out, but the government may learn from the firms' location responses to...

When a region successfully attracts a large firm by offering tax concessions, outright subsidies etc., the firm often commits itself to performance targets in terms of investment or employment. This paper interprets these contractually fixed targets as a consequence of incomplete information. It...

The predominant model of tax induced transfer pricing is based on the assumption that profit shifting is due to insufficient enforcement. However, evidence shows that the firms responsible for most profit shifting are also among the most frequently audited. We present an alternative model based...

Tax planning with intangibles has become one of the most popular and most vividly debated topics in international taxation. We incorporate various intellectual property (IP) tax planning models into forward-looking measures of effective tax rates, namely the disposal of intangibles to low-tax...

11 European countries now operate IP Box regimes that provide substantially reduced rates of corporate tax for income derived from important forms of intellectual property. We incorporate these policies into forward-looking measures of the cost of capital, effective marginal tax rates and...

11 European countries now operate IP Box regimes that provide substantially reduced rates of corporate tax for income derived from important forms of intellectual property. We incorporate these policies into forward-looking measures of the cost of capital, effective marginal tax rates and...

We present a new model of tax induced transfer pricing as an alternative to the oft-used concealment model. Inspired by interviews with practitioners, we consider a large multinational firm which is audited by the tax authority in the high-tax location. When this country adjusts the transfer...

We present a new model of tax induced transfer pricing as an alternative to the oft-used concealment model. Inspired by interviews with practitioners, we consider a large multinational firm which is audited by the tax authority in the high-tax location. When this country adjusts the transfer...

How do countries compete for mobile tax base when they lack precise information on how tax rates affect the tax base? We present a multi-period version of a classic tax competition model in which countries set source-based taxes under incomplete information on the tax base elasticity. This...

We present a multi-period model in which countries set source-based taxes with- out having precise information how their and their neighbours' tax rates affect the tax base. Countries can learn from past experience and from observing their neighbours' outcomes and/or tax policy choices. We...