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This paper studies the optimal disclosure of information about an agent's talent when it consists of two components. The agent observes the first component of his talent as his private type, and reports it to a principal to perform a task which reveals the second component of his talent. Based...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015046363
. -- tournament ; mechanism ; information revelation ; Jensen’s inequality …This paper studies the problem of information revelation in a multi-stage tournament where the agents’ effort in each …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001763125
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001573554
In a sequencing problem with linear time cost, Suijs (1996) proved that it is possible to achieve first best. By first best we mean that one can find mechanisms that satisfy efficiency of decision, dominant strategy incentive compatibility and budget balancedness. In this paper we show that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011538720
We study a strategic model of dynamic trading where agents are asymmetrically informed over common value sources of uncertainty. There is a continuum of buyers and a finite number n of sellers. All buyers are uninformed, while at least one seller is privately informed about the true state of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011451558
This paper studies a contest in which players with unobservable types may form an alliance in a pre-stage of the game to join their forces and compete for a prize. We characterize the pure strategy equilibria of this game of incomplete information. We show that if the formation of an alliance is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010487967
power after offering their mechanisms. I show that, in contrast with mechanism design models with one informed principal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009376226
We consider a Sender-Receiver game in which the Sender can choose between sending a cheap-talk message, which is costless, but also not verified and a costly verified message. While the Sender knows the true state of the world, the Receiver does not have this information, but has to choose an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011576182
The paper studies a model of delegated search. The distribution of search revenues is unknown to the principal and has to be elicited from the agent in order to design the optimal search policy. At the same time, the search process is unobservable, requiring search to be self-enforcing. The two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010358239
This paper provides new analytical tools for studying principal-agent problems with adverse selection and limited commitment. By allowing the principal to use general communication devices we overcome the literature's common, but overly restrictive focus on one-shot, direct communication. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010361996