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Career concerns and incentive compatible task design
Aoyagi, Masaki; Menuet, Maxime - 2024
This paper studies the optimal disclosure of information about an agent's talent when it consists of two components. The agent observes the first component of his talent as his private type, and reports it to a principal to perform a task which reveals the second component of his talent. Based...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015046363
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Information feedback in a dynamic tournament
Aoyagi, Masaki (contributor) - 2003 - [Elektronische Ressource]
. -- tournament ; mechanism ; information revelation ; Jensen’s inequality …This paper studies the problem of information revelation in a multi-stage tournament where the agents’ effort in each …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001763125
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Common agency with informed principals : menus and signals
Galperti, Simone - 2011
power after offering their mechanisms. I show that, in contrast with mechanism design models with one informed principal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009376226
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Achieving the first best in sequencing problems
Mitra, Manipushpak - 2000 - Revised
In a sequencing problem with linear time cost, Suijs (1996) proved that it is possible to achieve first best. By first best we mean that one can find mechanisms that satisfy efficiency of decision, dominant strategy incentive compatibility and budget balancedness. In this paper we show that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011538720
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Tournaments with gaps
Imhof, Lorens; Kräkel, Matthias - 2013
A standard tournament contract specifies only tournament prizes. If agents' performance is measured on a cardinal scale …, the principal can complement the tournament contract by a gap which defines the minimum distance by which the best … performing agent must beat the second best to receive the winner prize. We analyze a tournament with two risk averse agents …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010198511
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Market power and information revelation in dynamic trading
Gottardi, Piero; Serrano, Roberto - 2004
We study a strategic model of dynamic trading where agents are asymmetrically informed over common value sources of uncertainty. There is a continuum of buyers and a finite number n of sellers. All buyers are uninformed, while at least one seller is privately informed about the true state of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011451558
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Optimal delegated search with adverse selection and moral hazard
Ulbricht, Robert - 2014
The paper studies a model of delegated search. The distribution of search revenues is unknown to the principal and has to be elicited from the agent in order to design the optimal search policy. At the same time, the search process is unobservable, requiring search to be self-enforcing. The two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010358239
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Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication
Bester, Helmut; Strausz, Roland - 2004 - Version 1.3, December 2004
This paper provides new analytical tools for studying principal-agent problems with adverse selection and limited commitment. By allowing the principal to use general communication devices we overcome the literature's common, but overly restrictive focus on one-shot, direct communication. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010361996
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Contract design with limited commitment
Gretschko, Vitali; Wambach, Achim - 2018
to not renegotiating any mechanism. That is, we allow the principal, after observing the outcome of a mechanism to … renegotiate the resulting contract without cost by proposing a new mechanism any number of times. We provide a general …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011946012
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Voluntary disclosure in unfair contests
Ewerhart, Christian; Lareida, Julia - 2021 - Revised version
This paper studies the incentives for interim voluntary disclosure of verifiable information in probabilistic all-pay contests. Provided that the contest is uniformly asymmetric, full revelation is the unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcome. This is so because the weakest type of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012420336