We study the effects of granting an exit option that enables the private party to early terminate a PPP project if it turns out to be loss-making. In a continuous time setting with hidden information about stochastic operating profits, we show that a revenue-maximizing government can optimally...

This paper studies the optimal structure of procurement contracts between public and private sectors by mainly comparing two typical procurement types: traditional procurement and public-private partnership (PPP). We first set up a principal-agent model focusing on bundling effects of...

This paper analyzes the experience, high incidence, lesson learned and reflections on the issue renegotiations in Latin America, based in the evolution of PPP contracts through the last 25 years. The paper also shows how countries via new PPP laws, regulations, norms and specific platforms can...

In this paper we develop an index of the governmental support for PPP – a ‘PPP Governmental Support Index’ - which aims to measure the extent to which national governments provide an institutional framework that is either conducive or preventive for the introduction and diffusion of PPPs...